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Abstract. We argue that the costs of domestic and transnational inse-
curity are large and economically signicant and that they may vary with
the trade regime of a country. Then, in evaluating trade regimes, the gains
from trade need to be weighed against the change in the security costs they
induce. Within a simple model of trade, small countries that import a con-
tested resource unambiguously gain from free trade. However, exporters of
a contested resource incur additional security costs that are higher than the
gains from trade compared to autarky, as long as the international price of
the contested resource is not too high. We conclude with a discussion of
how domestic and transnational governance could reduce insecurity.
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The hidden hand of the global market would never work without
the hidden st. And the hidden st that keeps the world safe
for Silicon Valley's technologies to ourish is called the United
States Army, Air Force, Navy and Marine Corps (with the help,
incidentally, of global institutions like the U.N. and the Inter-
national Monetary Fund). And those ghting forces and insti-
tutions are paid for by all the tax dollars that Washington is
\wasting" every year. [Thomas Friedman, \Techno-Nothings,"
New York Times, April 18, 1998).]
If we ask ... what would be the most powerful mechanism for en-
suring that the forces of economic convergence overwhelm those
of divergence, the answer has to be jurisdictional integration.
[Martin Wolf (2004, p. 315).]
1 Introduction
Concepts like Thomas Friedman's \hidden st" and Martin Wolf's \jurisdic-
tional integration" are rarely, if ever, invoked in economic analyses of trade
and globalization. That is not surprising given that such analyses are based
on|or, at least, are intellectually inspired by|models of trade in which
concerns about security and governance are completely absent. However,
while abstracting from security concerns might be analytically convenient,
in practice many goods that are traded internationally or are important
inputs in the production of tradeable goods|oil, diamonds, land, water
resources|are subject to contestation, either domestically by rival groups
or internationally by dierent countries.
We shall rst argue that insecurity has costs that are economically im-
portant. These costs include direct costs such as those of arming and de-
struction as well as more indirect ones due to distortions in production,
consumption, and investment that are brought about by insecurity and con-
ict. In section 2 we discuss the various costs of domestic insecurity and
their economic importance whereas in section 3 we examine the potential
costs of transnational insecurity.Globalization and Insecurity 2
Dierent trading regimes can be expected to induce dierent costs of
insecurity, but how these costs vary with trading regimes has barely been
investigated within economics. The \classical liberal" viewpoint|which, by
default, appears to be the position shared by many economists|is that
more liberal trading regimes tend to reduce conict because the carrot of
the gains from trade brings potential adversaries closer to one another.3 To
our knowledge, there is no precise mechanism to which classical liberalism
appeals, but the positive eects of trade on security can work through a va-
riety of channels. For example, business contacts become personal contacts,
increased trade strengthens diplomatic ties, and increased human contacts
improve inter-cultural understanding. According to the liberal view, break-
ing down barriers to trade brings not only the familiar gains from trade, but
also reduces costs of insecurity.
A sharply dierent perspective comes from the \realist" school of inter-
national relations. In particular, when one party trades with an adversary
(either an actual or potential opponent), that party provides its opponent
fuel for growth and enhanced military strength.4 That increase in the adver-
sary's military strength, in turn, induces the party to expend more resources
on security itself, thereby detracting from the gains that had been realized
from trade. Indeed, according to the realist perspective, the increased secu-
rity costs could very well oset the gains realized.
Are the liberals or are the realists right? Attempting to answer such a
question requires a formal framework that can admit both trade and the
costs of insecurity. In section 4, we examine such a framework that borrows
from our previous work in Skaperdas and Syropoulos (2001) and Garnkel,
Skaperdas, and Syropoulos (forthcoming). Two \small" adversaries compete
for a contested resource that can be used in the production of tradeable
goods.5 The model we examine is simple enough in its symmetry such that
3Polachek (1980) is a rare articulation by an economist of the classical liberal perspec-
tive of the eect of trade on conict.
4Waltz (1979) and Gowa (1995) are two prima elaborations of the realist perspective.
Barbieri and Schneider (1999) report on the results of dierent recent political science
studies from both schools.
5The parties are \small" in the sense that they have no eect on international prices.Globalization and Insecurity 3
it allows for the two adversaries to be interpreted as either small countries
or groups within a single country. The costs of insecurity, measured by the
value of resources diverted from productive uses, vary with the degree to
which the countries in which the parties operate are open to trade. We
study, in particular, the two polar opposite regimes of autarky and free
trade. In determining welfare in such a setting, the gains from free trade
need to be weighed against the possibly higher costs of conict that emerge
in the autarkic outcome. The ndings that we report include: (i) importers
of the contested resource gain unambiguously under free trade; (ii) exporters
of the contested resource lose under free trade when the international price
of the resource is close enough to its autarkic price. Thus, even this simple
framework indicates that the question of whether the liberals or the realists
are correct in their views about trade cannot be answered unconditionally.
And, yet this framework identies specic and dierent conditions under
which the liberal and realist views hold. Moving beyond the liberal-realist
debate, our framework also provides new insights into the \natural resource
curse" and a distortion in trade patterns that is brought about by insecurity.
Ultimately, the costs of insecurity and, as our analysis indicates, the
eects of globalization depend on how eectively individual countries and
the relationships between countries are governed. In section 5 we stress
how economic globalization must be considered jointly with problems of
governance and discuss dilemmas that are within today's time horizon and
beyond.
2 The Economic Relevance of Domestic Insecurity
Since World War II civil wars have broken out in 73 countries, in many of
them more than once, and the estimated death toll resulting directly from
these conicts is over 16 million [see Fearon and Laitin (2003, p.75)].6 The
costs of arming and hiring combatants, the destruction of crops, structures,
capital infrastructure, and many other collateral costs have been surveyed
by researchers at the World Bank [see Collier et. al. (2003)].
6Fearon and Laitin (2003) base their ndings on the Correlates of War project, among
other sources. The denition of civil war uses the 1,000 deaths per year threshold.Globalization and Insecurity 4
In addition, there are the usual|for economists|indirect costs of war
that come from the static and dynamic misallocation of resources. Using
the methodology developed by Lucas (1987) to estimate the welfare costs of
the business cycle, Hess (2003) estimates the welfare costs of conict coming
from its eects on consumption alone for 147 countries spanning the period
1960{1992 to be on average 8 percent of steady-state consumption. The
individual estimates for some countries are, not surprisingly, a bit smaller.
For the United States, for example, the estimated cost is 3.2 percent. How-
ever, even this estimate is far greater than the Lucas-type estimate of the
welfare cost of the business cycle in the United States [Hess (2003), p. 17].
Moreover, the estimates for some lower-income countries are dramatically
higher|e.g., the cost is 65 percent in Iraq and 40.5 percent in Angola.
Civil wars are not the sole source of conict and security costs. Rodrik
(1998, 1999), for example, has drawn attention to distributional and social
conict, and the costs associated with them: strikes and lockouts, protests
that sometimes become violent, military coups, ethnic, religious, or class
rivalries, as well as common crime. The costs of such conicts would perhaps
be more dicult to estimate, but surely they are not negligible.
Another set of costs is associated with the public and private enforcement
of property rights. Take as an example property rights in land, a key factor
of production for which we would expect the property rights issue to be
settled by the 21st century. However, for many middle and low-income
countries property rights in land are publicly unenforceable, if they exist
at all. The Russian Parliament voted a land law for urban areas a few
years ago, but no such law exists for land in rural areas yet. In India, the
problem is not the absence of law in land but the hopeless conict of too
many contradictory laws, based on dierent legal traditions that have not
been resolved by the Indian state. Not surprisingly, then, as Lewis (2004,
p.199) states: \It is not clear who owns land in India. Over 90 percent of
land titles are unclear." In China, there are numerous land disputes between
local municipal enterprizes and peasant farmers with traditional rights that
have been reported and which threaten the country's social stability andGlobalization and Insecurity 5
economic growth in the future [see, e.g., Jacques, (2005)]. In the absence
of eective public enforcement of law in land|which in itself is expensive
but predictable|costly contests often take place for its private capture.
However, even those who are able to privately appropriate land are unlikely
to take the more ecient long-term actions that someone with clear title
would.
Thus, from civil wars, to distributional conict, to the private appro-
priation of land, insecurity and conict are associated with large costs. It
would be fair to say that these costs dwarf the (sometimes elusive) dead-
weight losses from Harberger triangles that dominate much of the study of
ineciency. Given the apparent economic signicance of conict costs, es-
pecially for low-income countries, it is surprising how little attention they
have received among economists.
For our purposes here, it is important to note that many civil wars and
lower-level conicts have taken place in countries with natural resources like
oil, diamonds, copper and other minerals, as well as those over the distri-
bution of land. Many of these same countries also suer from the \natural-
resource curse," the tendency to have low or negative income growth corre-
lated with higher exports of natural resources. We have a possible explana-
tion for this puzzle, presented below in section 4, that is based on the costs
of insecurity.
3 Insecurity in Interstate Relations
Trade and nancial transactions between parties located in dierent nation-
states naturally take place within an anarchic setting. That is, there is
no interstate authority that can serve as arbiter of disputes between those
parties. Not surprisingly, then, wars between states have been continually
taking place throughout recorded human history.
Since World War II, though, there have been fewer interstate wars than
in the previous half century with the number of fatalities considerably less
than those of the civil wars that have taken place over the same period.
This relative calm, however, has not translated into lower levels of securityGlobalization and Insecurity 6
costs. The superpower rivalry that existed between the United States and
the Soviet Union throughout much of the latter half of the twentieth century
left insecurity levels high. Thus, whereas the economic costs of destructive
warfare were relatively low, nations continued to pour resources into their
respective militaries, and the costs of insecurity were far from negligible.
The Cold War, while not a destructive war, was still a war of sorts. The
coldness of the Cold War was partly due to the threat of nuclear annihilation,
but it was also probably aided by the United Nations and other international
institutions that, though highly imperfect and weak, were providing some
semblance of predictability in international relations. For example, the con-
cept of \collective security" and the reluctance of the two superpowers and
their respective blocks to sanction changes in international borders provided
a measure of cross-border stability that made states reluctant to engage in
warfare against other states.7
The end of the Cold brought about the breakup of the Soviet Union, Yu-
goslavia, and Czechoslovakia, a uni-polar world, and, arguably, a weakening
of the United Nations. Whether the relative interstate peace of the post-
World War II period can continue into the future remains unclear. There are
two related though distinct problems that are likely to or have the potential
to jeopardize that peace, and in doing so would severely threaten economic
globalization. As we shall argue below, economic globalization itself without
appropriate governance could actually hasten the onset of more conictual
relations between states.
The rst threat comes from regional wars with resource contestation as
its primary, but by no means sole, source. According to Klare (2001), con-
ict over resources between states has become more serious lately. Oil is,
of course, the most important resource, but other minerals and also fresh
water resources are gaining importance as well. Here we provide only a few
7That practice along with the principle of non-interference in the internal aairs of other
states meant whoever controlled the capital of a country had international recognition as
the legitimate government. That recognition and the high economic value it conferred to
its holder might have made internal instability and civil warfare more likely than otherwise.
Herbst (2000) has argued with reference to sub-Saharan Africa partly on those grounds
against the recognition of international borders.Globalization and Insecurity 7
examples of such potential sources and areas of conict. The discovered and
yet-to-be-discovered oil wealth of Central Asia is fuelling disputes and arm-
ing in the area and beyond that could approach a new \Great Game." The
states surrounding the Caspian Sea|Russia, Kazakhstan, Turkmenistan,
Iran, and Azerbaijan|have still not settled on a formula for dividing the
rights of exploration and exploitation for oil. Where claims are settled, oil
companies and their governments vie for contracts, rival pipeline routes,
bids to buy local rights as well as local rms, and the whole endeavor is
tinged with subterranean geopolitical calculations that involve the United
States as well as all the lesser powers of Russia, China, and Europe. Fur-
ther South, with the Iraq war, the Middle East has already become a new
battleground with much uncertainty about where it will all lead. And, areas
with suspected oil reserves like the South China Sea (around the Spratly
and Paracel islands) have been already contested in minor hot incidents
as well as diplomatically by seven countries (China, Taiwan, Vietnam, the
Philippines, Indonesia, Malaysia, and Brunei).
Beyond oil, fresh water has perhaps been underrated for its potential
to create havoc in many areas with rapidly increasing populations, eco-
nomic growth, and economic globalization. It is not well-known, for instance,
that Egypt has threatened its upstream neighbors, especially Ethiopia, with
bombing water facilities if they were to go ahead with irrigations projects
on the Nile [Klare (2001, p.153)]. In the coming years, the countries of
the Upper Nile and the tributaries that drain into Lake Victoria (Sudan,
Ethiopia, Kenya, Uganda, Tanzania, Rwanda, Burundi, Congo) will need
to draw more water from the river, but any signicant reductions in the
downstream ow to Egypt could have catastrophic eects to the economy of
that country.8 We cannot predict how, or whether, such disputes will be re-
solved peacefully. In the meantime, it should surprise no one if impoverished
Ethiopia buys state-of-the-art anti-aircraft batteries. Some other examples
of rivers that have induced or are likely to induce contention include the Jor-
dan river (involving Israel, Jordan, Syrian, and the Palestinians), the Tigris
8Economic globalization intensies demand for water resources primarily through the
demand for water-intensive agricultural products, as is the case for Egyptian cotton.Globalization and Insecurity 8
and Euphrates (involving Turkey, Syria, and Iraq), the Indus (Afghanistan,
Pakistan, India), the Brahmaputra (China, India, and Bangladesh), and the
Mekong (China, Thailand, Laos, Cambodia, and Vietnam).
The second type of insecurity that is looming on the horizon is the real or
imagined rise of a peer competitor to the military and economic preeminence
of the United States. The most widely mentioned and discussed candidate
is China. Before September 2001 the role of China had been widely de-
bated especially in connection with its WTO accession. The proponents
of China's admission to the WTO were oering the liberal gains-from-trade
and peace-through-trade arguments, whereas its opponents were oering the
realist it-will-come-back-to-bite-you argument as well as more ideological ar-
guments regarding the nature of China's polity and its relation to Taiwan.
Although it would take China decades to become a genuine peer competitor
to the US, in the absence of signicant or prolonged measures not only to
improve relations, but also to eliminate all suggestions of hostile intent on
either side, the present calm could well turn out to be the calm before the
storm.9 For the experience of the rst instance of modern globalization is
not encouraging.
Before 1914, burgeoning trade ows and German bankers living in Lon-
don made war unthinkable for many commentators as it was reasonably
expected that war would destroy economically winners and losers alike. As
Norman Angell wrote in the best-selling The Great Illusion, published in
1909, \the capitalist has no country, and he knows, if he be of the modern
type, that arms and conquests and jugglery with frontiers serve no ends of
his, and may very well defeat them [quoted in Joll (1993, p. 161)]." But the
rivalries between the European Great powers proved too great to overcome.
9Of course there is the possibility of other states becoming peer competitors to the
United States, even some seemingly unexpected ones at the moment. For example, Japan
possesses the nuclear and missile technologies to become a major nuclear power within a
short period of time. While now Japan might not aspire to become a nuclear power, a
conrmation of North Korea's nuclear status or higher perceived threats from China could
well make Japan a nuclear power, after sucient preparation of its domestic opinion. A
nuclear Japan would radically change the world balance of power, even if it does not evolve
to a US peer competitor.Globalization and Insecurity 9
The initial trade openness gave in gradually to taris, other protective mea-
sures and eventually to the Great War.
Whether security costs are generated by neighboring states with resource
disputes or by a potential geopolitical rivalry, the extent of trade openness
can be expected to aect these costs. We turn next to an analysis of a
setting with small countries that is more appropriate for regional resource
disputes. While we have not yet examined the case of large countries in
exactly the same setting, Skaperdas and Syropoulos (2002) analyze a set-
ting in which the terms of trade are determined through bargaining, while
Skaperdas and Syropoulos (1996) examine a case where prices are inuenced
by the contestants.
4 Contesting a Resource: A Simple Model of Globalization
and Insecurity
We illustrate the main ideas discussed above within a framework that com-
bines the key features of the model presented in Skaperdas and Syropoulos
(2001) for the case of international conicts and of the model presented in
Garnkel, Skaperdas, and Syropoulos (forthcoming) for the case of domes-
tic conicts.10 Consider two parties that can be, depending on the context,
countries, groups or individuals. Provided that the parties are identical, our
analysis applies to both international conict and domestic conict. For
most of the presentation, we need not specify the identity of the parties.
They can be dierent groups within a single country or each can represent
a dierent country.
There are two factors of production. One factor is land. The other factor
is labor. Neither party has secure claims to land. That is to say, all available
land or \territory", denoted by To, is contested. Each party i, however, has
a secure endowment of R units of labor resources, which can be transformed,
on a one-to-one basis, into \guns," denoted by Gi, or used to produce also
10The model we present here is a generalization of the model in Skaperdas and Syropou-
los (2001), allowing us to examine additional issues. It is also a special case of the model
in Garnkel, Skaperdas, and Syropoulos (forthcoming), which allows for dierent degrees
of insecurity and includes a number of other ndings and in-depth analyses of issues like
the relation to the natural-resource curse.Globalization and Insecurity 10
on a one-to-one basis \food," a nal good valued for consumption. Given
party i's guns choice, Gi, R   Gi ( 0) units of labor will be available for
the production of food; therefore, party i's maximal production of food will
be maxfR   Gi;0g.11
Goods for nal consumption, food and oil, are produced under perfectly
competitive conditions. Clearly, the names we are using here are not meant
to imply that the model applies to environments that involve these commodi-
ties only, but other ones that might be contestable (e.g. diamonds, precious
metal, even agricultural production) or not. The goods can be traded domes-
tically or, depending on the trade regime, internationally. Let Oi and Ni,
represent party i's consumption of oil and food (or \nutrients") respectively.




i = 1;2 where  2 (0;1).
We suppose that the two parties have secure possession over the goods
they produce and over those they exchange, as well as their labor endow-
ments, R. Thus, the only matter of dispute between the two parties concerns
the territory, To.12 Both parties would like to take control of the contested
territory, particularly for its oil. However, due to imperfect institutions of
governance and enforcement, claims to this territory can be settled only via
overt conict or, equivalently in our model, under the threat of conict.
It is precisely the contestability of this territory that motivates the two
countries to allocate resources to guns. In particular, a party's production
of guns enhances the share of To it can secure. More formally, the share
of To that party i secures, qi, depends positively on the relative amount of
11Note that \guns" can stand for any costly appropriative activity that subtracts from
useful production and welfare|e.g., ordinary rent-seeking, inuence activities or litigation.
12Insofar as exchange reects the factor content of goods traded, it should not matter
for our central results whether the commodities or the factors used to produce them
are subject to dispute. Furthermore, that all territory is insecure simplies the algebra
considerably, but is not critical, as shown in Skaperdas and Syropoulos (2001, 2002) and
Garnkel, Skaperdas and Syropoulos (forthcoming).Globalization and Insecurity 11
guns it produces as follows:




if G1+G2 > 0; otherwise, qi = 1
2, for i = 1;2: According to this specication,
the share of territory that party i secures in the contest is increasing in
its own allocation of resources to arms,
@qi(G1;G2)
@Gi > 0 for i = 1;2, and
decreasing in the allocation to arms by the other party,
@qi(G1;G2)
@G j < 0 for
j 6= i and i = 1;2.13
Once the contested land is divided between the two parties according
to (2), each party engages in production. Party i produces R   Gi units of
food and Ti = qi(G1;G2)To units of oil, i = 1;2. Each party i, then, chooses
its consumption of oil and food, respectively Oi and Ni, to maximize (1)
subject to the constraint that its aggregate expenditure is equal to the value
of its output. Letting pi denote the relative price of oil measured in units of
labor, food, or guns, the value of party i's output or income, Yi, is
Yi(G1;G2) = piqi(G1;G2)To + (R   Gi); i = 1;2: (3)
As this expression reveals, the value of party i's output, Yi, depends not
only on i's own guns, Gi, but also on those of its opponent, Gj;j 6= i. This




piqi(G1;G2)To + (R   Gi)

i = 1;2: (4)
where (p)  (1   )1 (=p) represents the marginal utility of income.
We suppose each party i chooses Gi so as to maximize the group's wel-
13This functional form, rst introduced by Tullock (1980) and used extensively in the
rent-seeking literature as well as in the literatures on tournaments and conict, falls
within the general class of contest success functions axiomatized by Skaperdas (1996):
qi(G1;G2) =
f(Gi) P2
j=1 f(G j), where f() is a non-negative, increasing function. Also see Hir-
shleifer (1989), who investigates the properties of two important functional forms of this
class, including the \ratio success function," where f(G) = G
m with m > 0, which sim-
plies to (2) when m = 1.Globalization and Insecurity 12
fare, Vi in (4). There are two potential channels through which guns have
an eect. The rst is the party's income, and here the eect is twofold.
Ceteris paribus, a larger Gi raises the party's income Yi because it increases
the party's share of the contested oil To. At the same time, an increase in
Gi causes the party's income to fall because less labor is then available for
the production of food. The second channel through which guns can aect
welfare is through their possible impact on the relative price of oil. Exactly
how this price may be aected depends on the trade regime in place. This
dependence implies that the tradeo between guns and food itself is not
invariant to trade openness.
In what follows, we explore the implications for security costs and welfare
in the following two regimes: (i) autarky, where the two parties divide the
contested land (oil) according to the relative amounts of guns, and then the
parties consume only the oil and food produced domestically; and, (ii) trade,
where again the contested land is divided according to the relative amounts
of guns, but then oil is traded for food in international markets. In the former
case, the domestic market-clearing relative price of oil is a function of that
party's guns, resources and preferences. In the case of trade, for simplicity
and contrast, we assume both parties are \small" in world markets and thus
treat the relative world price of oil, p, as a parameter.
4.1 Outcomes Under Autarky
When barriers prevent trade across national borders, each party i chooses Gi
to maximize its respective payo, Vi(G1;G2), shown in (4) where pi is the
autarkic price determined endogenously by domestic resource constraints,
subject to the conict technology shown in (2) and the labor resource con-
straint Gi  R.
To be more precise, if the parties are countries, for given guns, the domes-
tic market-clearing price of oil in country i, pA








i = 1;2: (5)Globalization and Insecurity 13
Given our symmetry assumptions, it should be clear that pA
i will be identical
across the two countries i: pA
i = pA, i = 1;2.
If the parties are adversarial groups within a single country, then the pos-
sibility of integrated trade within the country between those groups implies
that the autarkic price is determined endogenously by an aggregate domes-
tic market-clearing condition which is common to the two groups. That is,
given the groups' gun choices, the autarkic price for both parties, pA
i = pA,





2R   G1   G2
To
: (6)
However, because the conict technology divides the contested resource
among the participants, ex ante symmetry translates into ex post symme-
try, and in the autarkic equilibrium our assumption that the two groups are
identical implies that no trade between domestic groups takes place.14 As
(5) and (6) reveal, when parties devote more labor resources to guns pro-
duction, the domestic supply of food falls relative to oil, and therefore the
autarkic price of oil falls.
The conict technology implies generally that, if party i's opponent were
to make no appropriative eort (Gj = 0, j 6= i), then party i could seize all
of To by producing an innitesimally small quantity of guns. But, neither
party would leave such an opportunity unexploited. As such, the \peaceful"
outcome where Gi = 0 for i = 1;2 cannot be an equilibrium outcome.













= 0 i = 1;2: (7)
14By contrast, in Garnkel, Skaperdas and Syropoulos (forthcoming), conict between
groups is modelled as a \winner-take-all contest," such that the model predicts trade,
despite the assumption of ex ante symmetry. Nevertheless, the equilibrium price under
autarky is independent of the ex post and ex ante distribution of guns. Furthermore,
even if each group factors in the eect that its own choice of guns has on the domestic
relative price, p
A, the symmetry assumption implies that they behave as if they can have
no inuence on the party's autarkic price at all.Globalization and Insecurity 14
The rst term inside the brackets weighted by the marginal utility of income,
(pA
i ), represents the marginal benet of producing an additional gun. An
increase in party i's production of guns increases the share of land and thus
oil that the party can secure. The marginal cost of producing an additional
gun is represented by the second term inside the brackets, also weighted
by the marginal utility of income. This marginal cost reects the foregone
opportunity for food production.
Under the assumption that the two parties are identical, the conditions
in (7) for i = 1;2, with (2) and either (5) for the case of interstate conict
or (6) for the case of intrastate conict, imply a unique interior symmetric
solution for guns, under autarky:
GA
i = GA = 
2 R; i = 1;2: (8)
As revealed by this solution, the quantity of guns both parties produce is
proportional to their labor endowment, R, and positively related to , which
measures the relative importance of oil to the two parties. The solution
for guns implies further that each party controls one-half of the contested
territory, qi = 1
2 for i = 1;2, and thus can extract and consume OA = Ti =
1
2To units of oil. In addition, each party i = 1;2 produces and consumes
NA = R   GA =
2(1 )
2  R units of food in the autarkic outcome.
4.2 Outcomes under Free Trade
When the barriers to trade are removed, party i chooses Gi, subject to the
resource constraint Gi  R, to maximize its respective payo as shown in
(4), with pi = p, which indicates the international relative price of oil (or











= 0 j 6= i; i = 1;2; (9)
15Assuming that parties are \small" relative to the global economy, their choices take
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at an interior optimum, are essentially the same as the rst-order conditions
to the analogous problem under the assumption of no trade, (7) for i =
1;2. But, the conditions in (9) that treat p as xed imply the following
equilibrium choices for guns:
GF
i = GF = 1
4pTo; i = 1;2: (10)
As the solution reveals, the optimizing choice of guns under free-trade is in-
creasing in the value of the contested resource, pTo, whereas the equilibrium
choice of guns under autarky, GA as shown in (8), is not related at all to the
contested resource but instead to the secure resource, R, and the parameter
that indicates the relative importance of oil in the determination of payos.
Thus, despite the apparent similarities between the two sets of rst-order
conditions, (7) and (9), the incentives to arm under the two regimes are
quite dierent, both qualitatively and quantitatively. The production of
guns is higher under trade relative to that under autarky, the larger is the
endowment of contested land relative to that of labor (To=R), the higher is
the price of oil relative to food (p), and the less important is oil ().
4.3 The Relative Appeal of Free Trade
Is it possible for the extra cost of guns to be high enough so as to outweigh
the gains from trade relative to autarky? To make such a comparison, we
need to calculate equilibrium welfare under the two regimes.
Combining the solution for guns (8) under autarky with either (5) or (6)
shows the following solution for the autarkic price:
pA





i = 1;2: (11)
In turn, using this expression with (8) and the payo function (4), we can
nd the equilibrium payo obtained by each player i under autarky, V A
i :
V A






o R1 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Similarly, combining (10) with (4) gives us the parties' equilibrium payos
under trade, V F
i (p):
V F




; i = 1;2; (13)
which can be shown to be strictly quasi-convex in the price of oil, p, reaching
its minimum at a price, pmin = 4
1 
R
To. This critical price is greater than
the autarkic price, pA, shown in (11). Furthermore, given the strict quasi-
convexity of V F(p), there exists another price, p0 > pmin, which is dened
uniquely by the condition, V F(pA) = VA = V F(p0), such that for a range
of international prices, p 2 (pA;p0), both parties prefer autarky to trade.
Figure 1, which depicts the parties' payos under free trade (V F) rela-
tive to their payos under autarky (VA) as a function of the world price of
oil (p), illustrates the central results of this model of trade and conict:
(i) For p < pA and p > p0; welfare under autarky is higher than welfare
under trade (VA > V F(p)):
(ii) For pA < p < p0, welfare under trade is higher than welfare under
autarky (V F(p) > VA):
Thus, even in the presence of contestable resources, importing countries
unambiguously benet from removing barriers to trade. Exporting countries
are more likely to benet the higher is the world price, but more generally
increasing the degree of trade openness is not necessarily welfare-enhancing.
The underlying logic here is straightforward: When the international
price of land or oil is suciently low (p < pA), the two parties antici-
pate the opportunity to buy oil cheaply|i.e., in exchange for a relatively
small fraction of their output of food|and accordingly, devote fewer la-
bor resources to guns relative to what they would choose under autarky
(GF < GA). In this case, the shift away from the autarkic regime to free
trade brings with it not only the familiar gains from trade, but also a re-
duction in the cost of conict. When the world price equals the autarkic
price, p = pA, the particular trade regime in place has no relevance for theGlobalization and Insecurity 17
valuation of the contestable good (GF = GA), implying that the costs of
conict under trade are identical to those under autarky; at the same time,
there are no gains from trade. But, when the international price of the con-
tested resource is higher than its autarkic price, p > pA, the stakes of the
contest between the two parties exceed those under autarky. Thus, a shift
from autarky to free trade would imply that the two parties allocate more
labor resources to guns under the free-trade regime relative to the autarkic
regime, GF > GA. Of course, when p > pA, there are positive gains from
trade too. However, provided pA < p < p0, those gains are not suciently
large to oset the added cost of conict under free trade. That is, a shift
from autarky to trade induces a welfare loss. Only when the price of land
is suciently high (i.e., p > p0) will the gains from trade again be greater
than the additional costs of guns under trade, as depicted in Figure 1.16
It is important to emphasize that, while our presentation has been based
on some very simple specications for utility and technology, the possible
negative eects of increasing globalization we have identied here are very
general. This robustness can be veried simply by dierentiating party














; j 6= i; i = 1;2;
where MF
i = Y F=p   qiTo is the excess demand for oil, obtained from
Roy's identity and the fact that @Yi=@p = qiTo. The rst term inside the
brackets weighted by the marginal utility of income represents the welfare
eect of an exogenous increase in the relative price of oil on the gains to
trade. If party i is an importer of oil (MF
i > 0), the eect is negative;
16Our discussion here has implicitly assumed, for convenience, that the labor resource
constraint, R   Gi  0, is not binding. However, as the solution for G
F in (10) shows,
there exists some world relative price of oil, denote it by e p, such that, at p = e p, the parties
fully exhaust their labor resource; any further increase in p beyond e p yields only the
gains from trade. Nevertheless, since G
A < R as shown in (8), e p > p
A. Therefore, the
eective welfare minimizing world price, given by minf~ p;pming, is strictly greater than the
autarkic price, p
A, implying that, even when the labor resource constraint binds, there
exists some range of world prices under which both parties prefer autarky to trade.Globalization and Insecurity 18
otherwise (MF
i < 0), the eect is positive. Hence, the gains from trade are
convex in the world price, reaching a minimum at the point where the world
price equals the autarkic price, p = pA. The second term inside the brackets
weighted by the marginal utility of income represents the welfare eect of
the price increase on the costs of conict. To be more precise, an increase in
the international price of oil raises the stakes of the contest, thereby inducing
the opponent to devote more labor resources to guns as can be seen in (10):
dGF
j =dp > 0. From equation (2), the increase in the opponent's guns choice
implies a reduction in party i's share of land and thus oil: @qi=@Gj < 0 for
i 6= j = 1;2. As such, the costs of conict under trade are monotonically
increasing in the world price. At p = pA, the costs are identical to those
realized under autarky, but for p < pA (p > pA) they are smaller (larger).
Furthermore, the particular assumption of price-taking behavior is con-
venient and can easily be relaxed without changing the main ndings. Skaper-
das and Syropoulos (2002), for example, allow for bargaining over the price
of land. By the same token, the ndings do not hinge on the particular way
in which conict has been modelled here. Findlay and Amin (2000), for
instance, consider a trade model in which security is modelled as a public
good and is increasing in one party's defense expenditures and decreasing in
the defense expenditures of the another party. Findlay and Amin nd that
the gains from trade can be outweighed by the higher defense costs brought
about by trade.
4.4 Other Implications and Issues
Interstate conicts had been frequent and very costly up to World War
II. World War I, in particular, took place just after the rst big wave of
globalization, which was also a time of intense competition for colonies and
resources between the Great powers. Since World War II, however, while the
frequency of interstate wars has fallen, civil wars have increased in frequency.
Indeed, most of the carnage and, arguably, much economic stagnation and
even retrogression since World War II can be attributed to civil wars [see
Collier et. al. (2003)]. Yet, as we have already hinted, the approach weGlobalization and Insecurity 19
have presented above applies to intrastate conicts as well as to interstate
conicts.
Our approach further provides an explanation for the \natural resource
curse," the tendency of many resource-rich parties to have low or negative
rates of growth despite the high prices of their exports. Trade not only
makes exporters of contested resources worse o relative to the autarkic
regime; it also leaves them vulnerable to declining welfare as increases in the
prices for their exports would tend to increase the cost of domestic conict.
As Mehlum et. al. (2006) argue, the key appears to be the security and
governance of potentially contestable resources. Countries that have solved
the problem of conict over resources do well, whereas those that have not
solved the problem can face declining welfare in the face of the seeming (and
eeting) prosperity that can come from higher oil or other export prices.
In addition, Garnkel, Skaperdas and Syropoulos (forthcoming) nd that
the presence of insecure land endowments distorts the pattern of trade be-
tween that country and others relative to the hypothetical scenario where
land endowments are perfectly secure. In particular, when the world price
of oil falls within a certain price range, the contest between domestic groups
over valuable resources reverses the direction of trade. Whereas the country
as a whole would be a net importer of the good that uses the contestable
resources intensively in production contestable resource (oil) if groups had
secure claims on To, in the presence of conict, the country is a net exporter.
More generally, for all world prices, the presence of domestic conict imparts
a positive bias on the country's exports.
The comparison between autarky and complete trade openness is too
stark for many contexts. In practice, there are a number of other instru-
ments that parties, groups, or even individual actors could employ to min-
imize the potentially harmful conict costs of greater openness to trade
and exchange. Authors in dierent but similar contexts have argued that
wage subsidies [Zak (1995) and Grossman (1995)], land reform [Horowitz
(1993) and Grossman (1994)], and market interventions in general [Dal Bo
and Dal Bo (2004)] can be optimal in the face of various types of conict,Globalization and Insecurity 20
from common crime, to low-level political conict, to insurrections, civil
wars, and interstate wars. In a somewhat dierent vein, Martin, Mayer,
and Thoenig (2005) have examined, both theoretically and empirically, the
eects of multilateral trade relative to those of bilateral trade on the prob-
ability of conict, and found how an increase in multilateral trade openness
may increase such a probability.
Another way to think of the conict costs that we have explored in this
section in relation to trade and exchange is as a large component of the
often-discussed, yet rarely modelled or operationalized, concept of \trans-
action costs." Taking these costs into account indicates that exchange is
neither likely to emerge nor necessarily optimal in a second-best world, and
can explain many practices and institutions that would be dicult to com-
prehend in a world with zero enforcement and conict costs.
5 Looking Ahead at Governance and Insecurity
Economic globalization without security is like putting the cart before the
horse, especially when the terrain is not at. The danger for both the cart
and the horse tumbling down a hill (or, worse, into a crevasse, like it was
for the rst part of the twentieth century) is high. Though economists have
been emphasizing lately the importance of the security of property rights for
economic performance, there has been scant attention paid to the costliness
of either security or insecurity, how these concretely aect resource allocation
and eciency, and how security might be achieved.
Thomas Friedman's \hidden st" and Martin Wolf's \jurisdictional inte-
gration" point, respectively, to the role of coercive capacity as the ultimate
source of enforcement and the importance of uniform or harmonized gov-
ernance in providing security and predictability in economic transactions.
Both are necessary for the eective security of property rights. They are
also costly and dicult to achieve and economists know very little about
how to do it. There are however some trends and options regarding the
future of governance that have been identied by some social scientists that
we briey discuss next.Globalization and Insecurity 21
5.1 Governance in Low-Income Countries
Most countries in the world today do not have anything resembling modern
governance, with eective laws, functioning courts, police, and bureaucra-
cies. To have, for example, property rights in land|which as we have dis-
cussed in section 2 many countries do not eectively have|a country needs
a legislative body with the ability to commit to the staying power of the
laws it creates, a title agency and trained civil servants, police and courts
that will enforce the laws, the professional infrastructure of lawyers, judges,
surveyors, or bureaucrats (and the universities that will train them), and
the belief that the process of securing title is routine and free of corruption.
Otherwise, a break anywhere in this chain of property rights enforcement
brings the whole edice down. Clearly, it is expensive to have modern gov-
ernance and therefore it should not be surprising that most countries, since
they cannot aord it, do not have modern governance. Not only is that the
case, but there are signs that governance and insecurity might be getting
worse in many low-income countries. That is part of the general trend iden-
tied by Fukuyama (2004, p.119): \For well over a generation, the trend in
world politics has been to weaken stateness. ::: [T]he growth of the global
economy has tended to erode the autonomy of sovereign nation-states by in-
creasing the mobility of information, capital, and, to a lesser extent, labor."
Furthermore, economic liberalization itself reduces tari revenue, a ma-
jor source of government revenue for low-income countries, and therefore re-
duces the state's capacity to accomplish the objectives it sets. With reference
to sub-Saharan Africa, Herbst (2000) has argued that external recognition of
states whose borders were determined by former colonial masters|instead of
by geography, similarity of culture, and internal political development|has
led to the severe underdevelopment of African states. In addition, Fukuyama
argues that the governments of the West, the International Financial Insti-
tutions, and NGOs actually undermine state capacity in many low-income
countries.17
17\Policymakers in the development eld should at least swear the oath of doctors to
`do no harm' and not initiate programs that undermine or suck out institutional capacity
in the name of building it." [Fukuyama (2004, p.42).]Globalization and Insecurity 22
\Failed" states and barely functioning states span the globe: in the
Americas, from Bolivia and Peru in the South all the way North to Guatemala;
all of Africa with the exception of South Africa; much of Southeastern Eu-
rope; all of the Middle East and Central Asia; much of Southeast Asia,
including Indonesia; as well as Papua Guinea and Vanuatu in Oceania.18 It
is by now recognized almost across the spectrum of informed opinion that
weak states do not serve anybody's interests (with the possible exception of
those who run such states). Thus, Fukuyama (2004, p.120) argues:
Strengthening these states through various forms of nation-building
is a task that has become vital to international security but is
one that few developed countries have mastered. Learning to do
state-building better is thus central to the future of world order.
If, however, international institutions with the targeted interventions they
undertake tend to weaken already weak states, as Fukuyama has previously
argued in the same book, how could developed countries engage in successful
\nation-building" without negating the very idea of a \strong state," unless
of course it is a wholly-owned subsidiary of the \developed countries," the
\international community," or some other outside entity? Would that ever
be achievable? Is this what the future holds?
It appears, however, that internal insecurity in low-income countries is
very much connected to what occurs in the rest of the world. Thus, transna-
tional governance appears to be important for the internal governance of
low-income countries, and it is not just important for resolving disputes be-
tween individual countries and avoiding future superpower confrontations.
We thus conclude with a brief discussion of transnational governance.
18An illuminating map of such a division of the world can be found in the front and back
aps of Barnett (2004), where the world is divided into a \functioning core" of states and
the \non-integrating gap" of either failed or barely-functioning states. Although one could
argue with Barnett's particular designation of boundaries, we think the basic dichotomy is
analytically useful. Barnett's own analysis, however, leaves much to be desired and could
be characterized as utopian. For example, he characterizes the U.S. as having a \unique
capacity to export security aound the planet" [Barnett (2004, p.7)] and appears to call
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5.2 Transnational Governance
The power vacuum that exists and is, arguably, expanding within many
countries will be lled one way or another. Local strongmen, one possible
way of lling the vacuum, are not likely to serve today's economic prerequi-
sites or share the international and domestic legitimacy (that has economic
functions as well). If, as another option of lling the power vacuum, \nation-
building" were to take place by outsiders, how much would the interests
of the insiders|the inhabitants of the countries|be taken into account?
Wouldn't there be a need to have checks on the outsiders by the insiders?
Would it even be possible, even if the outsiders were to know perfectly well
how to \build nations" (a highly doubtful proposition at the current state of
knowledge), to do so without provoking internal reactions that would negate
such an attempt? Is, then, old-style imperialism an option?
The old-style, allegedly liberal, British imperialism has received a second
positive look by Ferguson (2002) and others recently. But before imperialism
had a serious chance at revival, it experienced a rude reversal in the dust
and sands of Mesopotamia. Thus, with a Hobbesian solution to the world's
governance problems appearing to be out of the question for now, Lockean
or Rousseauan contractarian solutions are more promising.
One possibility is the strengthening of international organizations like
the UN, by providing it with some enforcement powers, sources of indepen-
dent or, at least, predictable, revenues, and mechanisms of decision-making
that would allow greater representation of those who are aected by its deci-
sions (like the citizens of countries that require building or re-building their
states).
Another complementary possibility is the continued evolution and ex-
pansion of regional organizations like the European Union or Mercosur.
Leonard (2005) even argues that the European Union model holds high
promise as the transnational organizational structure that is well-adapted
to the problems of the twenty-rst century, in the sense that it strengthens
governance in those countries that aspire to join, improves transnational
decision-making|especially when compared to other eras when the risk ofGlobalization and Insecurity 24
war was continually looming over Europe|and has multiple layers of checks
and balances so as to allow for as much representation and legitimacy as
would be feasible in such transnational organizations.
Both international and regional institutions and organizations are likely
to be strengthened in this century. The main question is how fast will they
be strengthened. For they need strengthening so as to forestall upheaval
and wars that are unforeseeable in terms of their precise timing, nature, and
length but which are generally predictable when the insecurity that exists
today within and across many countries is allowed to evolve unchecked.
Economic globalization without politically harmonized globalization is more
dangerous the longer it lasts without adjustments.
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Figure 1: Free trade vs autarchy in the presence of conict